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This article begins with an analysis of the state of the field of
consumer research and scrutinizes three leading streams of research:
the cognitive response paradigm, attitude theory, and the interpretive
turn. After arguing that the field lacks direction and risks being
overwhelmed by many fragmented additions to knowledge, I propose a
unified approach to consumer research integrating consumer behavior
with consumer action. The underlying theme is that consumers undergo
a fundamental tension between selfhood and sociality, and agency in the
form of self-regulation functions to reconcile the tension, thereby
helping consumers achieve moral balance, integration of personal and
social identity, and personal and social flourishing.
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My thesis in this article is twofold. First, beneath the surface of
a seemingly vibrant field of consumer research, there exists a
state of chaos and an impending crisis. Second, the way out of
this problem is for scholars to uncover that which is
fundamental in consumer behavior and consumer action and to
weave together an explanatory framework reflecting the core
roles of selfhood, agency, and sociality in consumption.
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STATE OF THE FIELD
Our understanding of the consumer springs from three
perspectives that seldom inform each other but that nevertheless
in totality provide a rich picture of the multifaceted life of
consumers. For purposes of discussion, I label these the
cognitive response paradigm, attitude theory, and the
interpretive turn.
The Cognitive Response Paradigm
Over the past 30 years, more than any other approach, the
cognitive response or information processing paradigm has
contributed much to our knowledge of how consumers react to
marketing stimuli. Through advertising, salesperson-customer
interactions, and other forms of communication, marketers
influence cognitive responses to pricing, product attributes, and
various marketing cues and incentives. Indeed, large bodies of
consumer research can be found in each of the following
subfields of information processing: attention, perception,
categorization, cognitive schemas, memory, information search,
inference making, choice, and persuasion (for reviews see
Bagozzi, Gürhan-Canli, and Priester 2002, chs. 5&6; Payne and
Bettman 2004).
One problem with this subfield of consumer research is that
we are experiencing a continual increase in fragmented
knowledge with little or no integration and thereby risk being
overwhelmed, confused, and mislead by the ever growing
piecemeal evidence. We lack a sense of how the many splinters of
knowledge fit into a unified conceptualization of information
processing. We also lack an understanding of the relative
importance of the many cognitive responses for explaining
consumer behavior and how the responses interface with the
constraints consumers face in their everyday lives and with the
controllable stimuli at the disposal of marketers. A coherent,
comprehensive model of information processing is missing, and
the relationship of information processing of consumers to their
own actions and marketing efforts remains largely unexplored as
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a consequence.
Another problem with the cognitive response paradigm to date
is its primary focus on what might be termed the bases for
decision making. Not only has research in this area neglected to
investigate cognitive responses in post decision making contexts
(e.g., concerning how intentions are implemented or thwarted,
how planning follows decision making, and how decisions are
monitored, modified, or abandoned), but it has largely ignored
the critical roles of emotional, motivational, volitional, and social
processes in consumption, especially with regard to agency and
action.
Two other shortcomings of the cognitive response paradigm are
its exclusive reliance on a rather passive conceptualization of
information processing and its dependence on a narrow point of
view of consumer rationality and how consumer rationality is
tested. Most research to date in the cognitive response paradigm
has treated consumers from a third-person point of view and
attempted to answer such questions as “Why did this choice
happen?” or “How did this or that attribute get weighted?” The
consumer is seen as a reactor to his/her environment and not as
an active participant in it. The assumptions are that all
consumer behavior is deterministic and that cognitive laws of
regularity underlie information processing. What have been
obscured and slighted are first-person points of view, consumer
agency, and nondeterministic explanations, rooted not in
regularity theory, but in causal powers or in considerations of
intentionality and in what Searle (2001) terms “gaps”
experienced by decision makers between reasons for acting and
decisions and between decisions and acting, whereby the
consumer avoids viewing the causal forces as sufficient for
deciding or acting but rather actively self-regulates his/her
behavior. More on this below when we develop an alternative
paradigm for consumer behavior. 
A related drawback with the cognitive response paradigm is its
over-dependence on experimentation as its preferred method for
knowledge generation. This limits the nature of information
processing that can be investigated in terms of number of
variables, prolonged information processing, and reflection and
deliberation, and it fails to address issues of external and
ecological validity (Bagozzi 2006). Understanding should not be
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limited to knowledge obtained by one methodology but rather
should be examined via a variety of means of inquiry because
how we gather and investigate phenomena shapes our
conceptualization and interpretation of consumer behavior. 
Before turning to the second perspective on consumer behavior
(i.e., attitude theory), I would like to briefly mention a nascent
development in neuroscience research in consumer behavior
(e.g., Yoon, et al. 2006; Yoon et al. 2007). Important discoveries
are being made in neuroscience concerning both deliberative and
automatic information processing and emotional responding.
Such developments are likely to particularly inform the cognitive
response paradigm but offer less promise for helping us
understand sociality because neuroscience is a reductive
framework, but social behavior at least in some aspects is
nonreductive.
Attitude Theory
Research in attitude theory has always represented an
alternative to research as practiced under the cognitive response
paradigm. Whereas the cognitive response tradition focuses
largely on antecedents of attitudes or related mental events,
attitude theory has examined the effects of attitudes and other
cognitive/evaluative variables on intentions and action. In this
sense, the two traditions complement each other: attitude theory
emphasizes primarily the explanation of what consumers decide
or do, whereas the cognitive response paradigm is marked largely
by what consumers think and how they make evaluations.
Still other contrasts between the two traditions can be pointed
out. Instead of exclusive use of experimentation, attitude
research chiefly employs survey methods, although on occasion
experiments are used to study attitude formation and the effects
of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control
on decisions or intentions. Perhaps the most obvious disparity
between the cognitive response paradigm and attitude theory is
the scope of research between them. The former is characterized
by dozens of variables, processes, and foci, most of which closely
parallel the many subfields of social and cognitive psychology;
the latter, until recently, has relied on two quite parsimonious
models. In particular, the Fishbein model or theory of reasoned
114 Seoul Journal of Business
action held sway from the 1960s until the late 1980s (e.g.,
Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980), whereby
intentions were regarded as proxies for behavior and in turn
were predicted by attitudes and subjective norms; and the theory
of planned behavior, which added perceived behavioral control to
the theory of reasoned action as a predictor of intentions, has
dominated attitude research from about 1990 to the present
(e.g., Ajzen 1991).
The theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned
behavior have spawned numerous studies, not only in consumer
research, but in such related areas as health care, organization
behavior, communication, the adoption of technologies, political
behavior, and everyday decision making (e.g., Armitage and
Conner 2001). Although practical applications of the theories
continue at full force, researchers have found that it is often
fruitful to introduce new predictors, reconceptualize variables in
the theories, and bring moderators into the theories with an aim
to improving their predictive power (e.g., Cooke and Sheeran
2004). Consider below the developments in marketing in this
regard in recent years.
A common approach has been to add predictors to the theories
of reasoned action or planned behavior. Some studies introduce
new predictors to explain attitudes or subjective norms, where
the goal is to avoid expectancy-value models, which have scaling
problems and are unwieldy because of the large number of
beliefs and evaluations involved, and to provide more
parsimonious accounts of attitudes and subjective norms.
Perceived reliability, accuracy, ease of use, usefulness, and
enjoyment of a new innovation have been especially effective
predictors in this regard (e.g., Davis et al. 1989; Dabholkar 1994;
Gaither et al. 1997). Other studies have added predictors of
intentions and/or behavior, such as expectations of success and
failure and frequency and recency of past behavior (Bagozzi and
Warshaw 1990), confidence in performing a behavior (Sutton et
al. 1987), and decision process importance, confidence, and
effort investment (Bagozzi, et al. 2003). Likewise, anticipated
emotions have been added to the theory of planned behavior and
found to supplant or add to the effects of attitudes on intentions
(e.g., Bagozzi, et al. 2003; Perugini and Bagozzi 2001; Perugini
and Conner 2000).
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Less common have been attempts to reconceptualize or
reformulate the nature or dimensionality of variables already
existing in the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior.
Bagozzi (1981a, b; 1982) proposed that expectancy-value models
can be construed in multidimensional senses in correspondence
with distinct reactions people have in particular situations, and
this has found application in studies of the purchase of diet
suppressants (Oliver and Bearden 1985) and coupon usage
(Shimp and Kavas 1984); and in reactions to messages in
advertisements for automobiles (Yi 1989). Likewise, so-called
global attitudes have been found to occur in separate affective
and evaluative dimensions of attitudes towards such acts as
participation in leisure activities (Ajzen and Driver 1991) and
decisions to donate bone marrow (Bagozzi, Lee, and Van Loo
2001). Unlike multidimensional expectancy-value attitudes,
where beliefs and evaluations must be tailored to the specific
context at hand, multidimensional global attitudes represent
general, overall affective and evaluative responses and thus
generalize across contexts.
Still another multidimensional conceptualization of attitudes
has been formulated for goal-striving contexts. In a weight loss
setting, Bagozzi and Warshaw (1990) hypothesized and found
that three distinct forms of attitude influence intentions to try to
attain a goal: attitudes toward goal success, attitudes toward
goal failure, and attitudes toward the means or process of
pursuing a goal. This approach has been applied in a number of
cases, such as the regulation of high-blood pressure (Taylor et al.
2001), exercising and dieting (Bagozzi and Kimmel 1995), dieting
decision making (Bagozzi et al. 2004) and body weight
maintenance (Bagozzi and Edwards 1998).
Adding predictors to the theories of reasoned action and
planned behavior broadens the scope of the theories, whereas
reformulating the nature and dimensionality of attitudes deepens
the theories. Another way that the theories have been deepened
is to posit a new account for how reasons for acting (e.g.,
attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control,
anticipated emotions) influence or become transformed into
decisions or intentions to act. For example, rather than treating
attitudes as passive dispositions to act, as under the theories of
reasoned action and planned behavior, Bagozzi and colleagues
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(e.g., Bagozzi et al. 2004; Bagozzi 2006) hypothesized that people
actively construct their attitudes in an anticipatory manner.
Specifically, decision makers are thought to consider their goals,
think about and imagine three aspects thereof (i.e., striving to
achieve the goal and achieving it, striving to achieve the goal but
failing to achieve it, and the process of goal pursuit itself), and
express their evaluations of each aspect in a process termed,
CIAD: consider-imagine-appraise-decide. A somewhat similar
process is proposed for considering positive and negative
anticipated emotions in goal striving (Perugini and Bagozzi
2001). In either case, the consider-imagine stages entail a type of
forward looking counterfactual thinking as a basis for either
attitude formation or the operation of anticipated emotions. Still
another type of deepening of the theories has been to introduce
desire as an essential mediator between the bases of decision
making and either decisions or intentions, in what has been
termed, the model of goal-directed behavior (e.g., Perugini and
Bagozzi 2001; Bagozzi 2006). We will consider the role of desire
in more depth below in the last major section of the article.
The final modifications of the theories of reasoned action and
planned behavior that warrant mention are those that consider
how other variables not in the theories moderate the effects of
the standard predictions. A growing number of such moderators
has been studied (e.g., Cooke and Sheeran 2004). In consumer
research, Bagozzi et al. (1992) found that, for the prediction of
intentions, subjective norms became more important, the more
state oriented a decision maker is, whereas attitudes became
more important, the more action oriented a decision maker is.
State orientation refers to a low capacity for the enactment of
action-related mental structures, and action orientation refers to
a high capacity of this type of enactment (Kuhl 1985). Other
research has shown that the degree of intention formation (ill-or-
well-formed; Bagozzi and Yi 1989) and the level of effort needed
to execute a behavior (Bagozzi, Yi, and Baumgartner 1990)
moderate the attitude-behavior relationship. In still another
study, perceived behavioral control in the form of resistance to
temptation was found to moderate the effects of subjective norms
on intentions (Bagozzi, et al. 2004). That is, subjective norm has
an increasing effect on intentions to diet, the greater the
resistance of temptations to breaking one’s diet. Finally, in a
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study of use of technology-based self-service, higher self-efficacy
attenuated the relationship between ease of use and attitude,
greater novelty seeking attenuated the relationships between
performance and attitude and between attitude and intention
and strengthened the relationship between fun and attitude,
higher need for interaction with service employees strengthened
the relationships between ease of use and attitude and between
fun and attitude, increased self-consciousness strengthened the
relationships between performance and attitude, fun and
attitude, and attitude and intention (Dabholkar and Bagozzi
2002).
In summary, attitude theory in one sense both shares and fails
to share one limitation with the information processing
paradigm. On the one hand, the many variables that have been
added as predictors, alterations in the meaning and structure of
existing variables, and incorporation of moderators to the
theories of reasoned-action and planned behavior threaten to
expand the abridgments in seemingly unlimited ways, thereby
creating similar dangers of proliferation and lack of integration
found with the cognitive response paradigm. But on the other
hand, the number of abridgements to the theories of seasoned
action and planned behavior is small in comparison to the
information processing paradigm, and more importantly, the
abridgements all build upon a common core: namely, all start
with attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control,
intentions and behavior; whereas the many studies in the
cognitive response literature suggest considerable disorder and
formlessness. Thus attitude theory perhaps makes for a more
manageable situation in terms of applied work, yet still gives
little solace perhaps for researchers hoping for some coherence
and accord at the level of a theory providing for a comprehensive
understanding and explanation of consumer behavior.
The Interpretive Turn
Some interaction and mutual learning occur for researchers
across the cognitive response and attitude theory traditions, but
less cross-fertilization has happened between these two
programs of research and the third, the interpretive turn. By
interpretive turn, I mean the disparate qualitative approaches in
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marketing drawing upon ideas and/or methods from
anthropology, sociology, philosophy, history, or literature. These
approaches can be roughly characterized as post-modern,
decentered, narrative, or politicized points of view to
understanding consumer behavior. All are marked by rich
descriptive content, and most employ first-person accounts.
Among others, consumer researchers have drawn upon ideas
espoused by Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, J?rgen Habermas,
Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, Irving
Goffman, Sylvan Tomkins, and Dan McAdams, as well as
developing points of view unique to consumer research. The
methodologies employed in this tradition, construed broadly,
include ethnomethodology, participant and nonparticipant
observation, depth interviewing, content analysis, case studies,
focus groups, and other field and grounded research approaches.
The interpretive turn is difficult to characterize; its focus is
more on understanding than explanation and prediction, per se.
However, the basis for understanding is sometimes difficult to
evaluate and interpret for people steeped in other traditions.
Although seeming to provide knowledge of consumer behavior in
and of itself, the interpretive turn in practice has been in a
precarious position in the field and more often than not
distinguished by its competition and conflict with the
information processing and attitude theory perspectives. This is
most evident in competition for journal space and faculty
positions, where the interpretive turn has suffered in comparison
with the other perspectives. More telling, the interpretive turn
itself is rather lacking in coherence, and up until now at least
has contributed little to a sense of unity or how we might strive
for unity in consumer research. But in this regard, it, too, along
with the cognitive response and attitude theory perspectives,
proves the point of a need for new thinking in consumer
behavior.
A PROPOSED DIRECTION
By now it should be obvious that what I am calling for is the
specification of a more unified approach to the understanding
and explaining of consumer behavior and one that aims for
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comprehensive questions and answers. To discover the essence
of consumer behavior, we must look above and below the
heterogeneous and frequently changing manifestations of such
behavior and identify its common core and moreover that which
is universal. Long ago, Leibniz (1981, p. 326) pressed for an
analogous point of view in his early (circa 1700) explorations into
human understanding, which he portrayed by using such terms
as the “psychic unity of humankind” and the “inner essence of
man”. 
My own approach has been to depict the consumer as being in
a tension or dialectic between selfhood and sociality, and where
consumer agency complements more deterministic aspects of
consumer behavior (e.g., Bagozzi 1992, 2000, 2005, 2006).
Consumer agency is manifest in purposive action and self-
regulation, whereas selfhood rests in personal identity, and
sociality plays out through social identity, group norms, and
interpersonal dynamics. The consumer can be thought to
navigate his/her life with regard to consumption by resolving the
tensions that occur between selfhood and sociality, as he/she
purposively self-regulates his/her desires, decisions, and
actions. By looking above the fray, I refer to a specification
providing guiding, abstract scientific principles; by looking below
the surface of seemingly chaotic consumer behavior, I call for
identification of basic, universal concepts and processes
underlying consumer behavior. My own outlook has been to
draw upon ideas and principles from philosophy (especially the
theory of action and the theory of mind) and the philosophy of
science and to combine these with theory development and
testing of specific consumer behaviors by use of a relatively small
number of fundamental concepts and procedures.
Before turning to thoughts on this new perspective on
consumer “behavior”, I wish to propose that a distinction be
made between consumer behavior and consumer action (Bagozzi
2006). I suggest that ‘consumer behavior’ be used to designate
the psychological and neural processes that consumers undergo
and the psychological and neural states that they experience. I
submit that ‘consumer action’ be used to refer to what a
consumer does as an actor or agent in a self-regulative or willful
way; such actions are typically either goal directed or expressive.
The nature of action was captured cogently long ago by Aristotle
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who said, “The first principle of action — its moving cause, not
its goal — is rational choice, and that of rational choice is desire,
and goal-directed reason” (Aristotle, 2000 Nicomachean Ethics, p.
104).1) It should be noted that consumer behavior and consumer
action need to be integrated into any meaningful theory of who
consumers are and why and how they do what they do (Bagozzi
2006).
Basic and Universal Concepts
To identify that which is basic and essential in consumer
behavior and consumer action, and that which is universal, and
separate this from that which is variable and fragmented, I
propose that we re-specify the complex concepts and processes
currently proliferating in the literature into simpler concepts and
processes. Both in my theoretical and empirical research, as well
as in questionnaire design and stimulus construction, I have in
recent years attempted to begin with the foundation of
conceptual primitives and lexico-grammatical universals. The
work of linguists Goddard (1998) and Wierzbicka (1996) has been
particularly influential for me in this regard.
Language and words are important to behavior and action for
both the person experiencing behavior and enacting an action
and other persons (e.g., a partner, a marketing researcher)
attempting to explain the behavior or action of another person.
The words we use and how we use them shape and are shaped
by our thoughts and feelings and ultimately affect how we react
and act in the world. Indeed, the words we use or react to are
connected to basic psychological events or experiences and are
essential inputs to descriptions of behavior and action as well as
theory building and testing. Wierzbicka (1996, 1997; see also
Goddard 1998) builds her framework of conceptual and linguistic
universals on three assumptions. First, all languages are
presumed to have a common lexicon and grammar, which form a
core that can be used to construct universal concepts in
consumer research. Second, Wierzbicka maintains that the
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1) Another translation of Aristotle’s words provides further insight: “The origin
of action — its efficient, not its final cause — is choice, and that of choice is
desire and reasoning with a view to an end” (Aristotle 1915, Nicomachean
Ethics).
common core in languages is innate and is conditioned by a
prelinguistic “readiness for meaning”. Support for this point of
view can be found in psychology (e.g., Bruner 1990, p. 22).
Third, the common core provides a basis for a mini-language
that can be used to define universal hypotheses and descriptions
of basic processes in consumer research. 
Wierzbicka (1996) terms her framework the ‘natural semantic
metalanguage’ where about 60 universal semantic primitives
have been identified (see table 1). For our purposes, the most
important conceptual primitives and lexical universals occur in
the categories of (1) mental predicates, (2) actions, events, and
movements, (3) attributes, (4) existence and possession, and (5)
substantives. Other categories are important, too, in the sense of
being used with instances of the aforementioned categories to
build explanations, descriptions, hypotheses, and theories (e.g.,
instances from the categories of determiners, quantifiers, logical
concepts, time, space, similarity, and intensifiers can be used to
build hypotheses where the variables entering the hypotheses
come from one or more of the 5 categories listed above).
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Table 1. Wierzbicka’s Conceptual Primitives and Lexical Universals
(from Wierzbicka, 1996, 1997).
Substantives I, You, someone (person), something (thing), 
people, body
Determiners this, the same, other
Attributes good, bad, big, small
Mental predicates think, know, want, feel, see, hear
Speech say, word, true
Actions, events, movements do, happen, move
Existence, and possession there is, have
Life and death live, die
Logical concepts not, maybe, can, because, if
Time when (time), now, after, before, a long time, a
short time, for some time
Space where (place), here, above, below, far, near,
side, inside
Intensifier, augmenter very, more
Taxonomy, partonomy kind of, part of
Similarity Like (how, as)
Quantifiers one, two, some, many/much, all
To take an example of the principle of conceptual primes,
consider the following explanation or explication of ‘customer
satisfaction’, which I have constructed based on similar cognitive
scenarios Wierzbicka has done for emotion concepts (e.g.,
‘happy’). We can explicate customer satisfaction as follows by use
of conceptual primitives and universals from table 1:
Customer satisfaction (Customer X was satisfied)
(a) Customer X felt something (because he/she thought
something)
(b) sometimes a customer thinks:
(c) “some good things happened to me
(d) I wanted things like this to happen
(e) I do not want anything else now”
(f) when this customer thinks this, this customer feels
something good
(g) Customer X felt something like this.
Given the act, context, actor and experience (i.e., consumption
of a good/service by customer X resulting in a good feeling), we
can label the emotion described here as customer satisfaction.
Notice that the words used in this explication closely correspond
to the concepts shown in table 1. Concepts like ‘think’, ‘feel’,
‘someone’ (customer X), ‘good’, ‘thing’, ‘happen’, ‘me’, and ‘want’
are basic in the sense that they cannot be made clearer by
further explanations. They are self-explanatory so to speak. Even
undefinable. One value of use of such primitives is that they are
not merely basic in themselves but can be combined with other
primitives to build larger, meaningful configurations: e.g., “some
good things happened to me, I wanted things like this to happen,
I don’t want anything else now”. This particular configuration
describes the basic customer experience of a goal achieved
accompanied by satiation (e.g., “I seek satisfaction of my desire
for stimulation in the morning by drinking a cup of coffee, and as
a result my desire has been satisfied and I am contented and
desire no further stimulation at the moment”). A second value of
use of such primitives is that they are universal (i.e., present in
all or at least most languages) and can help us understand and
explain thinking processes, emotions, and actions across
cultures. Not only are conceptual primitives and combinations of
primitives universal, but so are many grammatical patterns. All
this can aid researchers in uncovering basic consumer behavior
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and action and identify that which generalizes and that which
does not.
Notice too in the particular explication above of customer
satisfaction that it points to an underlying theory of satisfaction.
That is, the explication is consistent with the appraisal theory of
emotions in psychology (e.g., Lazarus 1991) which maintains
that the critical determinant of any emotion is the resultant
evaluation and interpretation that arise after comparing an
actual state with a desired state (see also my theory of the role of
emotional self-regulation — i.e., outcome-desire and outcome-
identity units — for the attitude-intention relationship, Bagozzi
1992, pp. 186-194). So above, we see that a satisfied consumer
experiences this feeling (“feels something good”) because of
his/her appraisals (i.e., “because he/she thought something”) of
the outcome of consumption (“some good things happened to
me”) and its comparison to his/her goal or desire (“I wanted good
things like this to happen” to me).
The Consumer Core
Since about 1992 (e.g., Bagozzi 1992; 2000, 2005, 2006;
Bagozzi and Kimmel 1995; Bagozzi, Priester, and Gürhan-Canli
2002; Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and Pieters 1998; Perugini and
Bagozzi 2001; Bergami and Bagozzi 2000; Bagozzi and Lee 2002;
Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Basuroy 2003; Bagozzi and Dholakia
2006a,b), I have been working on a theory of consumer action
and have tested many of its components. For purposes of
discussion, it is helpful to talk about this theory in two parts: the
consumer core and the augmented consumer core.
Figure 1 presents the consumer core where it can be seen that
five central variables are identified: goal desire, goal intention,
action desire, action intention, and self-regulation. These five
variables constitute the heart of consumer decision making with
regard to goal striving. Not shown in the figure are antecedents
to goal desires (see dashed arrow at left), which consist of goal
setting processes and such psychological reactions as positive
and negative anticipated emotions, and antecedents to action
desires, which entail such psychological reactions as attitudes,
subjective norms, group norms, and perceived behavioral
control. Also not shown in the figure are the implications of
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action intention (see dashed arrow at right), which include such
mental and physical events as planning, trying, monitoring of
progress toward a goal, affect resulting from appraisals of rate of
progress or lack thereof in goal pursuit, goal attainment/failure,
and post-goal outcome thinking and feeling processes. We will
have more to say about the antecedents and consequences of the
consumer core below when the augmented core is considered.
Finally, another set of determinants directly affect self-regulation
and are also part of the augmented core (see dashed arrow at top
of figure 1).
The five variables in the consumer core can be expressed by
use of the universal semantic primitives displayed in table 1.
Indeed, goal desire and action desire are both instances of the
mental predicate, “want”. A goal intention can be described by
use of semantic primitives from table 1 as follows: “I will do
something to make something happen”, where “something
happen” refers to a specific objective, end, aim, or goal (e.g.,
acquire X, achieve Y) and “do something” means pursue X or Y.
Notice that a goal intention is stimulated by a goal desire but
unlike a goal desire implies a commitment to strive to attain a
goal. The specific action in the commitment is at this stage in
decision making undefined or vague but rather refers to the
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Figure 1. The Consumer Core
general objective to acquire/achieve that which is desired by
some action to be determined later. By contrast, an action
intention, also termed a behavioral intention or implementation
intention in the literature, can be described by the following
semantic primitives: “I will do it now”, for an intention to act at
the present moment, or “I will do it after now”, where “will do” is
an allolexy of “do” when combined with “now” or “after now” (e.g.,
“later” or a particular time or at a specific occasion and location).
Action intentions can be succeeded or accompanied by planning
as to when, where, how, and how long one intends to act.
The remaining variable in the consumer core, self-regulation,
can also be expressed with semantic primitives. By self-
regulation I mean one of two processes that for lack of better
words might be termed reflectivity and reflexivity, respectively.
Reflective self-regulation for me means the active imposition of
personal moral or self-evaluative standards to a felt or possible
goal desire or behavioral desire (Bagozzi 2006). That is,
consumers evaluate their desires and decide whether they want
to have or want to not have the desires that they experience and
scrutinize. They do this in such a way as to cancel, override,
modify, or postpone further consideration or implementation of
the desire to act. More specifically, I propose that, when thinking
about one’s desire to act (or one’s goal desire), a consumer asks
him or herself such questions as the following:
• Am I the kind of person who should have such a desire?
• Am I the kind of person who acts on this kind of desire?
• Is the desire consistent with the kind of person I wish to be?
• Will acting on this desire lead to personal flourishing?
• What effect will acting on this desire have on other people
important to me, other people whom I may not even know, or
social welfare writ large?
In a parallel manner, I propose that a consumer can reflect upon
his/her lack of felt desire for a goal or to act. Here the person
considers whether to accept, embrace, or construct a desire for a
goal or to act; questions analogous to those noted above could be
posed self-reflectively with regard to a self-perceived lack of felt
desire for a goal or to act (e.g., “Is my not feeling a desire to act
consistent with the type of person I wish to be?”).
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As shown in figure 1, I hypothesize that moral and self-
evaluative standards which are reflectively considered in relation
to goal and action desires serve to moderate the effects of goal
desire on goal intention and the effects of action desire on action
intention. In other words, consumers are able to exercise a
certain degree of control over their desires. Reflectivity is an
active process akin to will power. I propose that consumer
desires are stoked externally by marketing stimuli or internally
by imagined needs or biologically-based processes. Left by
themselves, desires operate deterministically to influence
intentions. But by the willful imposition of moral and self-
evaluative standards, one can stop the effect of a desire on
intentions or create or activate a desire to influence decision
making where no such desire currently exists. Reflectivity goes to
the very core of the consumer self and constitutes a form of
moral agency rooted in who a consumer thinks he/she is or
wants to be. Consumers thus are capable of judging and
choosing who they wish to be and acting accordingly. They do
this in the face of deterministic pressures on their desires.
To the active operation of reflectivity, I propose that a passive
or automatic type of self-regulation also functions to control
desires at times. I call this reflexivity and claim that it resides in
learned values, dispositions, traits, virtues, and vices (Sekerka
and Bagozzi 2007). An example would be a virtuous consumer
deciding spontaneously to resist his/her personal desire to
purchase a product that harms the environment. Here the virtue
is presumably internalized and has been operating for a while as
a personal policy that is activated upon being confronted with an
enticing purchase. Examples of learned virtues deserve pointing
out and include such instances as forgiveness, gratitude,
generosity, kindness, social justice, and trustworthiness.
Before leaving the topic of the consumer core, it is informative
to consider the contents of desires and intentions. Figure 1
shows two kinds of desire: goal desires and action desires. Both
can contain biological and hedonic content, and both can
contain intellectual and volitive content. A goal desire, sometimes
also called an intrinsic or terminal desire, is often biologically
and hedonically constituted in the sense of being rooted in
neural processes connected to reward and punishment and
reflected in feelings of pleasure and pain (“good” and “bad” in
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terms of semantic primitives). Yet it is possible, although
perhaps less common, for a goal desire to consist of cognitive
content, where rational reasons describe the desire. The
biological or hedonic desire has been termed an appetitive desire
by Davis (1997, p. 136), who notes that linguistically it is
expressed as a noun in such sentences as “I have a desire to...”
or “I have a desire for...” and is synonymous with appetite,
hungering, craving, yearning, longing, and urge. Davis asserts
further that “objects of appetitive desires are appealing, things
we view with pleasure” (Davis, 1997, p. 136, emphasis in original
omitted). By contrast, a more thinking based desire, yet with
motivational implications similar to appetitive desires, is termed
a volitive desire and appears as a transitive verb in such
sentences as “I desire to...” and “I desire...”, and is synonymous
with want, wish, and would like (Davis 1997, p. 136). Action
desires, sometimes called behavioral and instrumental desires,
are generally volitive in the above sense and exist for the purpose
of achieving a goal desire. Nevertheless, it is possible on occasion
to desire to perform an action for its own sake (e.g., for the
aesthetic or kinesthetic pleasure of the action itself), and hedonic
feelings can be part of an action desire itself, such as occurs
when one desires to exercise but dreads the effort, boredom, and
pain entailed by it.
Intentions, too, come in different forms and content. Figure 1
illustrates the role of goal intentions and action intentions in the
consumer core. We have already mentioned that desires normally
lead to intentions deterministically but can be thwarted or where
no desire exists a desire can be generated by self-regulatory
processes. Notice further that the processes dealing with goals
(goal desire and goal intentions) are linked to processes dealing
with means (action desire and action intention). This linkage,
too, is a deterministic one, as implied in many dictums or
maxims made by such philosophers as Aquinas and Kant:
“He/she who wills the end, wills the means”. Yet I would not rule
out the possibility that certain social and psychological processes
mediate or moderate the path from goal intentions to action
desire under certain conditions.
That being said, what forms and content of intentions
constitute the consumer core? Most research to date has focused
on personal intentions, which may defined as a person’s
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commitment, plan, or decision to achieve a goal or carry out an
action by him/herself alone (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). The
conceptualization and measurement of personal intentions can
be criticized on a number of grounds. First, intentions have been
either equated with the object or referent of intentions, i.e., with
“what the individual is trying to do”, and thereby beg the
question of what it is (Allport 1947, p. 186; Heider 1958, pp. 83,
108), or have been left largely undefined, taken for granted, or
basically aligned with action (see the treatment in Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975). Second, Ajzen (1991, p. 181) claimed that intentions
“are indicators of how hard people are willing to try, of how much
of an effort they are planning to exert”, which can be argued is
too broad a definition in scope because it includes trying, effort,
and planning all in one concept, where it would be better to
differentiate all these, inasmuch as they are not only distinct
psychological reactions but have potentially distinct causes and
distinct effects in consumer behavior and consumer action
(Bagozzi 2006). Likewise, it seems that the frequently used “very
unlikely” to “very likely” item for measuring intention (i.e., “I
intend to X”) is rather limited and misses the mark in terms of
capturing volitional aspects of intentions beyond self-predictions
that one will act. For example, mental and physical effort,
commitment, and conviction can be essential elements of
intentions in some cases, but expressions of likelihood of acting
may not capture these.
Although personal intentions are obviously important variables
for study in consumer research, I would argue that the
application of such intentions is limited to individual decision
making and that much of consumer decision making is in fact
essentially social in nature (Bagozzi 2000, 2005; Bagozzi and Lee
2002). We might term socially based intentions, collective
intentions, to contrast with personal intentions. Collective
intentions differ from personal intentions in terms of
conceptualization, function, and measurement.
Two kinds of collective intentions deserve mention (Bagozzi
2000, 2005, 2006). One is a personal intention to do something
with a group of people or to contribute to, or do one’s part of, a
group activity (e.g., “I intend to play football this afternoon with
my friends” and “I intend to help pick blueberries with my family
on the weekend”). A personal intention is an individual intention
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when one intends to act alone in a personal activity (e.g., “I
intend to finish reading the best-seller book I have been reading
this evening in bed”); it is a collective intention (i.e., a personal
intention to participate as a member of a group) when one
intends to act as a part of a group activity (e.g., an intention to
do one’s part of a group project). In either case, we have a
personal intention: an I-intention to do a solitary act in the
former case, an I-intention to do something with one’s group or
to contribute to the group’s activity in the latter case.
A qualitatively different form of collective intention is what we
might call a “we-intention”. A we-intention is a collective
intention rooted in a person’s self-conception as a member of a
particular group (e.g., an organization) or social category (e.g.,
one’s gender or ethnicity), and action is conceived as either the
group acting as a unit or the person acting as an agent of, or
with, the group. I propose further that we-intentions exist in two
closely related versions. The first is the shared we-intention and
is expressed in the form, “I intend that our group/we act” (e.g., “I
intend that our family visit the Great Wall of China and other
historical sites next summer”). The second version of the we-
intention is communal and framed in the form, “We (i.e., ‘I and
the group to which I belong’) intend to act” (e.g., “We intend to be
the most productive group in the company next quarter”).
Collective intentions have been studied recently in a number of
studies. See Bagozzi and Lee (2002), Bagozzi and Dholakia
(2002), Dholakia, Bagozzi, and Pearo (2004), Bagozzi, Dholakia,
and Mookerjee (2006), Bagozzi and Dholakia (2006a,b), and
Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Pearo (2007).
In sum, the consumer core captures the central processes in
decision making in the sense that it represents the most
proximal determinants of volitions (i.e., goal desires and action
desires), the decision to pursue a goal, and the decision to
perform specific instrumental actions. Desires serve three
functions in the consumer core. First, they reflect automatic,
nonconscious affective/evaluative somatic markers of objects
and actions as being pleasant/unpleasant or good/bad in what
Damasio terms the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio 1994,
pp. 173-174; 1999). Second, they function to integrate or
summarize multiple reasons for pursuing a goal and multiple
reasons for deciding to implement particular means for goal
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achievement. By reasons, I mean the bases for desires which
reside in distal psychological states and events (e.g., attitudes,
subjective norms, anticipated emotions, social identity, self-
conscious emotions). Finally, desires summon motivation to form
or activate intentions: goal desires incite goal intentions; action
desires evoke action and implementation intentions. The reasons
for or bases of desires (i.e., many psychological states such as
attitudes) often lack motivational content or contain weak or
conflicting motives. All these aspects of the consumer core
operate deterministically in the sense of constituting complex
combinations of hard-wired neurobiological and learned
responses. Nevertheless, the course of seemingly deterministic
processes can be interrupted, modified, or created anew by self-
regulatory processes, which entail willful control of one’s
decisions and ultimately one’s actions. We turn now to
discussion of the psychological and social environment in which
desires and self-regulation are imbedded, as well as the
implications of the consumer core for action.
The Augmented Consumer Core
Figure 2 presents both the consumer core and the augmented
consumer core. I will discuss the role of the augmented
consumer core in three pieces. The first concerns the
determinants of goal desires and action desires. The second
addresses the origins of self-regulation (i.e., of moral and self-
evaluative standards, which are a type of second-order or meta
desires). The third deals with the consequences of action
intentions.
Goal and action desires have largely distinct antecedents.2) We
can think of a goal desire as the resultant of deliberative or
spontaneous goal setting processes. Anticipated emotions refer to
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2) It should be noted that intentions in the consumer core might under certain
circumstances also be directly influenced by mental events or states instead
of indirect influence occurring through desires. Empirical work to date,
however, supports the proposition that desires are essential mediators of the
effects of many psychological variables on intentions (e.g., Bagozzi and
Dholakia 2006; Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Basuroy 2003; Perugini and Bagozzi
2001; Taylor, Bagozzi, and Gaither 2001, 2005; Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Pearo
2007; Dholakia, Bagozzi, and Pearo 2004; Bagozzi and Edwards 1998;
Bagozzi and Kimmel 1995).
prefactual processes whereby a consumer considers how they
would feel if they were to achieve a goal (anticipated positive
emotions) and how they would feel if they failed to achieve a goal
(anticipated negative emotions) (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and
Pieters 1998). The stronger the positive anticipated emotions and
the stronger the negative anticipated emotions, the stronger the
goal desire (Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Basuroy 2003). Anticipatory
emotions are presently felt emotional responses to the prospect
of a desired/undesired future event (Baumgartner, Pieters, and
Bagozzi 2006). Unlike anticipated emotions which can in
principle encompass any positive and negative emotion,
anticipatory emotions are limited to instances of the categories of
hope and fear. A defining characteristic of an anticipatory
emotion is its dependence on the probability of an event
happening. Hope and fear (and their cognates) are intimately
bound or endogenous to the certainty/uncertainty of an event.
The greater the felt hope and the less the fear, the greater the
goal desire. Anticipated emotions, similar to attitude toward
success and attitude toward failure (Bagozzi and Warshaw 1990),
might be conditioned in their effects by expectations of success
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Figure 2. The Augmented Consumer Core (adapted from Bagozzi, 2006)
and expectations of failure, respectively. These outcome
expectancies function exogenously and interact with anticipated
positive and negative emotions, respectively, to influence goal
desire (not shown in figure 2). The final antecedent of goal desire
shown in figure 2 is affect towards the means of goal pursuit.
Independent of the outcome of goal striving, a consumer can
have emotional reactions to the means or process of
contemplated goal pursuit. The more pleasant (less unpleasant)
the means, the greater (less) the strength of goal desire (Bagozzi
and Edwards 1998; Taylor, Bagozzi, and Gaither 2001).
Another way of looking at goal setting as a precursor to the
formation of goal desires is through means-end chain theory and
the laddering methodology. These procedures yield goals, values,
or motives for a desired end and moreover reveal linkages
between goals, values, or motives. A number of studies have
taken this perspective: Bagozzi and Dabholkar (1994), Bagozzi
and Edwards (1998); Bagozzi and Dabholkar (2000); Bagozzi,
Bergami, and Leone (2003); Morandin, Bergami, and Bagozzi
(2006); Taylor, Bagozzi, Gaither, and Jemerson (2006).
In a somewhat parallel manner, we can think of action desire
as the resultant of goal intention, but with the effects of attitude
toward the act, subjective norms, group norms, and perceived
behavioral control held constant (see figure 2). These variables
have been studied extensively in the theory of planned behavior
in terms of their effects on intentions. But here we hypothesize
that their effects on intentions will be mediated by action desire
(Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006a; Dholakia et al. 2004; Perugini and
Bagozzi 2001).
Self-regulation can be thought to be influenced by three broad
determinants: social and self-conscious emotions, feelings of
caring, love, or empathy, and social identity (see figure 2). Social
and self-conscious emotions function as consumers’ situational
sensors to scrutinize whether they or their behavior, action,
goals, or desires fit a significant social group or particular social
setting based on evaluative signals from members of the target
group or setting or based on internalized emotional
predispositions. Common social and self-conscious emotions
include social anxiety, pride, shame, embarrassment, guilt, envy,
and jealousy. These emotions shape, instigate, or condition the
consumer’s moral and self-evaluative standards.
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The role of social and self-conscious emotions has not been
studied much in consumer research (cf., Louro, Pieters, and
Zeelenberg 2005), although their capacity in personal selling has
been studied extensively (e.g., Bagozzi, Verbeke, and Gavino
2003; Bagozzi, Belschak, Verbeke, and Gavino 2007; Verbeke
and Bagozzi 2000, 2002, 2003; Verbeke, Belschak, and Bagozzi
2004, 2006). However, no studies have yet investigated the
effects of social and self-conscious emotions on moral and self-
evaluative standards. Likewise, the influence of caring, love, and
empathy on moral and self-evaluative standards has not been
studied in consumer research. We hypothesize that, both
developmentally over time and once moral and evaluative
standards have been internalized, caring, love, empathy, and
social and self-conscious emotions will function respectively, to
form assist, or activate self-regulatory responses. We further
posit that, before the development of moral and self-evaluative
standards or for ill-formed standards, goal desires and action
desires will tend to operate unimpeded to trigger their respective
intentions. In other words, early in life or for less mature
consumers, desires will function deterministically. The self-
regulation of desires, and hence decision making and action, will
occur in a willful way to the extent that moral and self-evaluative
standards become full-grown so to speak. Of course, the
operation of moral and self-evaluative desires can involve
personal struggle and the confrontation of opposing tendencies.
As shown in figure 2, self-regulatory processes in the form of
moral and self-evaluative standards are also proposed to be
shaped by a consumer’s social identity. Social identity has three
components: self-awareness of group membership, which is a
cognitive state based on self-categorization processes, affective
commitment, which entails emotional feelings of belongingness,
attachment, and fidelity toward one’s group, and evaluative
commitment, which encompasses value connotations and
collective self-esteem (Bagozzi and Lee 2002; Bergami and
Bagozzi 2000). Some research supports the effect of social
identity on desires (see dashed arrow in figure 2; Bagozzi and Lee
2000; Bagozzi and Dholakia 2002, 2006a; Bagozzi, Dholakia,
and Pearo 2007). No research to date has examined the effects of
social identity on moral and self-evaluative standards, but I
suspect that, at least for mature consumers, this is a common
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route to self-regulation. I wish to make the point, too, that social
identity is not meant here to be limited to a specific group but
could conceivably entail identification with some social ideal
such as the welfare of mankind, humanity, or communion with
nature. Identification with a religious community or religious
ideal could also be an aspect of one’s social identity.
The final part of the augmented consumer core we wish to
discuss concerns the implications of action intentions, which are
shown in the lower right hand portion of figure 2. After an action
intention has been formed, action might be initiated
straightaway, as occurs for some spontaneous and everyday
decisions. However, for many decisions, action intentions either
will be activated at a later point in time or else will entail
performance of many complex steps before they result in action
initiation. Gollwitzer (1996) proposed that planning about when,
where, and how to act is an important stage in goal striving, and
he termed such planning, implementation intentions. Because
planning will in the normal case follow a decision to act, I prefer
not calling planning, implementation intentions. Rather it is an
action intention, I claim, that leads to planning.
Following planning (see figure 2), another complex stage of
action initiation occurs: trying. By trying, I mean such mental
and physical activities as activation of motor responses,
allocation of time and mental and physical energy, monitoring of
progress, resistance of temptations deflecting one from goal
striving, overcoming impediments to goal attainment, changing
plans and making new plans as needed, maintaining willpower
and sustaining self-discipline, and reassessing commitments to a
goal and chosen means. Various trying activities are shown in
figure 2 to interact with affect arising from appraisals of the rate
of progress enroute to goal achievement. Here two feedback
systems function to guide action: approach and avoidance
processes. These are affective responses that occur in reaction to
evaluations of a consumer’s goal progress such that, when the
rate of progress is below a reference value, negative affect occurs,
and when the rate of progress is at or above the reference value,
positive affect results. When progress is made in pursuit of either
a sought-for incentive or avoidance of a threat, a consumer will
feel elated or relieved, respectively, and the action implication is
to stay the course. When progress wanes in pursuit of an
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incentive or avoidance of a threat, one feels sad or anxious,
respectively, and the action implication is to try harder to achieve
the goal. Of course, when consumers try to achieve a
consumption goal, they sometimes alter the target goal or their
definition of success or failure; indeed they even might abandon
goal striving in certain cases.
The augmented consumer core “ends” with goal attainment or
failure. Nevertheless, cognitive responses and emotional
reactions therefrom feedback to selected variables and processes
depicted in figure 1, as well as to antecedents to these responses
and reactions not shown in the figure.
CONCLUSION
My aim in this article has been to sketch a comprehensive,
unified framework for integrating and explaining consumer
behavior and consumer action. The variables and processes
specified in the framework rest on basic, universal concepts that
are used to construct processes and hypotheses governing
consumer behavior and consumer action. The framework builds
a conceptualization of the consumer wherein aspects of the
consumer’s selfhood, particularly resting in individual desires
and personal identity, function in a dynamic tension with
sociality, which is expressed in social identity, including
interpersonal, group, and collective forces. The dynamic tension
or dialectic between the individual and social self is resolved, or
at least partially and temporarily reconciled, through self-
regulation. Self-regulation, in turn, resides in processes of
reflectivity and reflexivity and is performed in a willful manner so
as to thwart, override, modify, or even create desires. It should
be noted, too, that the tension or dialectic I refer to is not merely
one of give and take but implies the possibility of a dynamic
balance between selfhood and sociality. In this way, selfhood and
sociality both constrain and nourish each other under the
tutelage of self-regulation.
It was not possible to fully describe the processes of sociality
that infuse most instances of consumer behavior and consumer
action discussed in this article. Elsewhere I have developed the
social concepts and processes involved in a theoretical article
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(Bagozzi 2005), which entail more detailed explications of
collective goals, joint commitment, mutual action, and other
group-based thinking. The early stages of ongoing empirical work
attempts to test hypotheses concerning sociality.
I began this article by pointing out limitations of the cognitive
response or information processing paradigm. My position here
should not be taken as a categorical critique of the paradigm and
a call to abandon it. Indeed, past and current knowledge from
the cognitive response paradigm provide a foundation for many
of the variables presented in figure 2, and many opportunities
exist for applying cognitive response ideas and conducting
experimental research in testing the linkages shown in figure 2
(especially with regard to self-regulation, post intention
processes, and emotional processes), and considering new
moderators, mediators, and independent variables. Although I
would not give up hope that a grand synthesis of the many
findings in the cognitive response paradigm might be found, I do
not see such a synthesis in sight and doubt that such a search is
the best use of our resources. The value of the cognitive response
paradigm and interpretive turn may well lie in their potential for
providing background and for clarifying aspects of the consumer
core and its augmentation.
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